Dr. Miles\u27s Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the Wake of Leegin by Harrison, Jeffrey L.
University of Florida Levin College of Law 
UF Law Scholarship Repository 
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Dr. Miles's Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the 
Wake of Leegin 
Jeffrey L. Harrison 
University of Florida Levin College of Law, harrisonj@law.ufl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Dr. Miles's Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the Wake of Leegin, 45 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1125 (2010) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 




DR. MILES’S ORPHANS: VERTICAL CONSPIRACY AND 
CONSIGNMENT IN THE WAKE OF LEEGIN 
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court overturns a well-established case, the 
impact extends well beyond that ruling.  Cases that have survived 
for extended periods of time typically spawn complementary cases.  
These complementary cases protect the ruling in the principal case 
from erosion by the imagination of business planners, lawyers, 
scholars, and judges.  Or, these complementary cases may be the 
cases that narrow the rule in the principal case when the Court 
wants to temper the effect of—but not overrule—its prior decision.  
When the principal case is, however, overturned, both of these types 
of cases become orphans.  Without the parent case, it is not clear 
what the complementary cases stand for. 
This scenario is currently playing out in the field of antitrust.  
In 2007 the Supreme Court took a step many thought overdue and 
many more expected.  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc.1 overturned a nearly hundred-year-old case, Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.2  In Dr. Miles, the Court 
established that resale price maintenance (“RPM”) was a per se 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3  Post-Leegin, RPM may 
still violate the Sherman Act, but only after a plaintiff prevails 
under the more difficult and economically meaningful “rule of 
reason” standard.4  Since Leegin, there has been a great deal of 
 * Stephen C. O’Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of 
Florida.
 1. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 2. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 3. Id. at 408 (“[A]greements or combinations between dealings, having for 
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are 
injurious to the public interest and void.”).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 4. In brief, under the per se standard, a practice is unlawful without 
further inquiry if it can be shown that the parties engaged in the practice.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009).  Under the rule of reason, the 
plaintiff must also demonstrate that the practice had an anticompetitive effect.  
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).  In actuality, the rule of reason does 
not represent a single standard; there may be varying degrees of proof 
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activity as legislation is produced at both the state and federal level 
to effectively overrule its holding and declare as a legislative matter 
that RPM is per se unlawful.5  And, as one would expect, there has 
also been a great deal of scholarly commentary.6  To some extent, 
the level of commentary about Leegin is surprising because the 
Court had already taken a number of steps that raised barriers to a 
successful antitrust claim based on RPM, even under the per se 
standard.7  In fact, from a practical standpoint, Dr. Miles, if not 
depending on the practice.  See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 
(1999). 
 5. On April 14, 2009, Maryland became the first state to enact legislation 
making RPM unlawful despite Leegin.  See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW  
§ 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  At the federal level, a bill introduced in July 
2009, provides: “Any agreement setting a price below which a product or service 
cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate section 1 of 
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1).”  H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. 2 (2009).  Numerous 
state attorneys general have joined in support of the bill.  See Letter from Nat’l 
Ass’n of Atty’s Gen. to John Conyers, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm. & 
Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm. 1–5 (Oct. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20091027.HR_3190.pdf 
(urging the House to pass H.R. 3190 and bearing signatures of forty-one state 
attorneys general).  By the summer of 2010 California, Michigan, and Illinois 
had joined Maryland in making RPM per se unlawful.  For an excellent survey, 
see Richard Liebeskind & Joseph R. Tiffany, Two Years After Leegin, Questions 
Remain on Lawfulness of Resale Price Maintenance, ADVISORY (Pillsbury 
Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, New York, NY), July 31, 2009, available at 
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/053986E13BCE687E8E0CA
54E89372048.pdf.  In March 2008, after Leegin, New York, Illinois, and 
Michigan settled an RPM dispute (via consent decree) with furniture 
manufacturer Herman Miller.  See Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent 
Decree, New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-02977 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 
2008), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/antitrust/pdfs/Signed 
_FJ.pdf. 
 6. See generally Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of Antitrust and the Slow 
Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437 (2009); Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas 
A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price Agreements in the Wake of Leegin v. PSKS: 
Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (2009); Warren Grimes, The 
Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of Antitrust Laws of 
Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467 (2008); Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. 
Miles Is Dead.  Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating 
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937 (2009); Lance 
McMillian, The Proper Role of the Courts: The Mistakes of the Supreme Court in 
Leegin, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 405; Jason A. Casey, Note, The Rule of Reason After 
Leegin: Reconsidering the Use of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, 42 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919 (2009); Scott Looper, Note, Reading Roberts: A Critical 
Framework for Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Decision in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 46 HOUS. L. REV. 177 (2009); Julie M. 
Olszewski, Note, Overruling a Nearly Century-Old Precedent: Why Leegin Got It 
Right, 94 IOWA L. REV. 375 (2008). 
 7. See infra Part II.B.  The Court had narrowed the definition of what 
constitutes RPM in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 
U.S. 717 (1988) and raised the bar for summary judgment for resellers claiming 
to have been terminated as a result of RPM in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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officially overruled, had already become far less important as a case 
and less influential in affecting business strategy.8
Despite this outpouring of discussion, a critical element of 
Leegin has not been explored: What is the continuing influence, if 
any, of nearly one hundred years of Supreme Court decisions that 
were complementary to Dr. Miles?  Do they now play the same role 
they played in the era of Dr. Miles?  For example, are consignment 
agreements ever the type of agreements that could lead to antitrust 
liability?  This Article explains why they should not play the same 
role they did in the era of Dr. Miles and the danger of adhering to 
the analyses found in those cases.  Indeed, if the complementary 
cases are not reconsidered, or if their lack of relevance is not at least 
understood, they could very well have the effect of undercutting the 
new direction Leegin signals. 
An assessment of Dr. Miles’s orphans is not a simple one.9  The 
task of predicting their future is difficult because the orphaned cases 
are not themselves consistent.  In fact, they represent two different 
approaches depending on how broadly or narrowly the Court wanted 
the prohibition of RPM to be applied and the types of antitrust 
errors to be avoided.  For example, in the period from Dr. Miles in 
1911 to Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. in 1977,10 the 
Court, with one major exception,11 devoted itself to protecting the 
per se rule.  In other words, the Court generally reacted firmly and 
negatively to efforts to avoid Dr. Miles’s prohibitions.12  This 
objective can be viewed as avoiding the error of treating as lawful a 
practice that is actually anticompetitive.13  After 1977, the Court 
reversed course and delivered a series of opinions that favored 
undermining the rule that RPM is a per se violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.14  Here, the objective clearly was to avoid 
condemning a practice that actually was pro-competitive.  In effect, 
the orphans created by Leegin have sharply differing characteristics.  
This difference, as will be explained, reflected a change in the 
Court’s view of vertical restraints more generally. 
Part I briefly describes Dr. Miles and Leegin.15  Part II explores 
the cases decided before and after Sylvania from the perspective of 
 8. See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text (explaining that, after 
recent cases, “findings that firms have engaged in per se unlawful RPM are 
rare”). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 11. See infra notes 95–108 and accompanying text (discussing United 
States v. Park, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960)). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (1984); Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A 
Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41 (1984). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. For a good comprehensive description of Leegin, see Dresnick & 
Ronzetti, supra note 6, at 235–49. 
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what it means to agree to fix resale prices.  It also assesses the 
importance of those cases in the aftermath of Leegin.  As a general 
matter, those cases are characterized by formalistic line drawing 
largely in service of the Court’s varying conviction about the 
correctness of the per se standard.  Part II concludes that, insofar as 
Leegin signals a more substantive economic approach to RPM, those 
cases have the potential to retard this development and thus must 
evolve to fit the new approach. 
Part III then examines another set of cases that sought to 
distinguish RPM from consignment agreements.  This important 
distinction—between instances in which goods are sold on 
consignment, as opposed to being resold—was for a time a possible 
way to avoid the prohibitions of Dr. Miles.  The continued 
importance of this distinction is examined.  Part III also pulls this 
analysis together in light of a limited number of post-Leegin cases.  
It suggests that the types of errors these sets of cases were designed 
to avoid are no longer a serious concern.  Yet, if this is not 
recognized by lower courts, the full beneficial effects of Leegin may 
not be realized.16
I.  FROM DR. MILES TO LEEGIN 
There is probably little to be said about any hundred-year-old 
case that has not been said before.17  This may go double for Dr. 
Miles, which has been a focal point of antitrust debate.  The case 
itself is, however, a bit more complex than simply standing for the 
per se status of RPM.  In fact, Dr. Miles Medical Company, the retail 
price-fixing firm, was the plaintiff that sought to enjoin a wholesaler 
who was acquiring Dr. Miles’s products from other wholesalers and 
retailers at prices below the resale price those wholesalers had 
contractually agreed to and then reselling them at “cut-rate” 
prices.18  In effect, the defendant, John D. Park, was interfering with 
the contracts Dr. Miles had with its buyers. 
Ironically, Dr. Miles invoked a free-rider argument to justify its  
 16. One possibility is that RPM will become effectively per se lawful.  In 
fact, since nonprice vertical restraints were moved from the per se category to 
the rule of reason category, almost no suits challenging these restraints have 
been successful.  See infra Part III.B.  The Supreme Court in Leegin strongly 
suggests that this should not be the case.  See infra notes 144–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 17. The articles cited in note 6, supra, represent a small percentage of 
articles in which Dr. Miles is of importance.  A search of Westlaw, conducted on 
August 18, 2010, reveals that the terms “Dr. Miles,” “RPM,” or “resale price 
maintenance” have appeared just in the titles of articles 164 times.  The terms 
have appeared in text of articles over 5000 times. 
 18. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374–82 
(1911). 
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restrictions.19 According to the complaint:
[C]ertain retail establishments, particularly those known as 
department stores, had inaugurated a “cut-rate” or “cut-price” 
system which had caused “much confusion, trouble and 
damage” to the complainant’s business and “injuriously 
affected the reputation” and “depleted the sales” of its 
remedies; that this injury resulted “from the fact that the 
majority of retail druggists as a rule cannot, or believe that 
they cannot realize sufficient profits” by the sale of the 
medicines “at the cut-prices announced by the cut-rate and 
department stores,” and therefore are “unwilling to, and do not 
keep” the medicines “in stock” or “if kept in stock, do not urge 
or favor sales thereof, but endeavor to foist off some similar 
remedy or substitute, and from the fact that in the public mind 
an article advertised or announced at ‘cut’ or ‘reduced’ price 
from the established price suffers loss of reputation and 
becomes of inferior value and demand.”20
In short, Dr. Miles was disadvantaged as far as interbrand 
competition because the resellers of its products were unwilling to 
promote them, given the intensity of the intrabrand competition. 
It is all history now, of course, but ultimately the Court rejected 
a number of justifications offered by Dr. Miles, including the 
contentions that secrecy of the formulas gave it the right to control 
subsequent sale prices21 and that as manufacturer it could control 
the resale price.22  The Court noted that restraints on alienation had 
long been held to be unlawful.23  The decision of the Court was not, 
however, completely void of a rudimentary economic analysis.  The 
restraint, according to the Court, may be reasonable if it is 
advantageous to the parties and not harmful to the public.24  Here, 
the Court asked whether the restriction was comparable to the sale 
of good will.25  In some sense, the instincts of the Court were correct 
in terms of asking whether it is possible that the public could be 
better off by virtue of the agreement.  Of course, we now know that 
the public may be better off if the intrabrand restraint leads to 
greater interbrand competition.26  In 1911, however, this analysis 
 19. For those unfamiliar with antitrust law, the irony is that the free-rider 
argument eventually became the theoretical basis for permitting vertical 
restraints, including RPM. 
 20. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 375. 
 21. See id. at 400–04. 
 22. See id. at 404–08. 
 23. See id. at 409. 
 24. Id. at 406. 
 25. Id. at 407. 
 26. This is, however, an empirical question that turns largely on the 
preferences consumers have for the features added by a firm in order to compete 
once it can no longer engage in price competition.  The baseline presentations 
on RPM are William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market 
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was not in the cards and the Court analogized the agreement to one 
between competitors and explained, “[A]greements or combinations 
between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of 
competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public 
interest and void.”27
Between Dr. Miles and Leegin, the pivotal case, philosophically 
speaking, is Sylvania.28  Indeed, it is rightly regarded as the turning 
point for antitrust law more generally.  Sylvania stands out for a 
number of reasons well known to any antitrust scholar, but three of 
which are of particular importance.29  First, the decision changed 
the law as it then existed with respect to nonprice vertical restraints 
on distribution.30  Prior to that time, albeit for only a short period, 
these types of restraints were viewed as per se unlawful.31  The 
strength of the Court’s determination to make the change is 
indicated by the fact that the decision could have been much 
narrower in scope.32  Second, and most importantly, the case 
signaled, quite loudly in fact, that the Court was adopting a more 
economically sophisticated approach to antitrust law, and, 
specifically, that it was accepting the view that increases in 
interbrand competition may necessitate decreases in intrabrand 
competition.33  Third, in a footnote that was to become something of 
millstone around the Court’s neck until Leegin was decided thirty 
Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985) and 
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
86 (1960). 
 27. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408. 
 28. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 29. Commentaries in the aftermath of Sylvania include Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 
135 (1984); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints: A 
Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91 (1979); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand 
“Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The 
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restraints, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1978). 
 30. These restraints are those placed by a seller on those to whom it sells 
with respect to their own sales.  For example, the seller may restrict the area or 
the types of customers to whom the resellers may sell. 
 31. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378, 382 
(1967). 
 32. The Court could have distinguished Schwinn and not overruled it.  
Schwinn involved a defendant with a much higher market share than the 
defendant in Sylvania and that was employing a greater network of restraints 
than found in Sylvania. 
 33. The central point of the Court’s reasoning was the recognition of free-
rider effects.  These effects occur when a firm is not able to fully internalize or 
profit from its own efforts.  The classic example in antitrust would be a full-
service seller of audio equipment that offers information, listening rooms, and 
comfortable surroundings to would-be shoppers who then leave the store only to 
purchase the same equipment online.  See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 212–15 (5th ed. 2009). 
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years later, the Court rejected the idea that the analysis involved in 
nonprice vertical restraints could be applied to vertical restraints on 
price.  According to the Court: 
As in Schwinn, we are concerned here only with nonprice 
vertical restrictions.  The per se illegality of price restrictions 
has been established firmly for many years and involves 
significantly different questions of analysis and policy.  As MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE notes . . . some commentators have argued that 
the manufacturer’s motivation for imposing vertical price 
restrictions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions.  
There are, however, significant differences that could easily 
justify different treatment.34
The Court did not elaborate on what the differences were 
between price and nonprice restraints other than to note that 
Congress had not reacted to the per se status of RPM in the rule’s 
then sixty-six years of existence.35  Perhaps the Court really could 
not think of any economic distinction—possibly because it is hard to 
describe one—but was unwilling to overturn a decades-old decision. 
The reasoning applied in Sylvania led, of course, to Leegin—
albeit thirty years later.  Whether Leegin means effective per se 
legality for RPM, as Sylvania did for nonprice vertical restraints,36 
cannot be determined yet.  Nevertheless, without any mention of its 
footnote in Sylvania, the Court (finally, some would observe) 
accepted the fact that the interbrand/intrabrand free-rider analysis 
that was persuasive in Sylvania was applicable to RPM.37  The 
Court noted and described the possible anticompetitive 
 34. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
460 (6th ed. 2009) (citing Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto 
Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68 (1991)). 
 37. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 
(2007).  It bears noting that Leegin was hardly delivered with the conviction of 
Sylvania.  Sylvania was a 6–2 decision with Justices Marshall and Brennan 
dissenting and with then-Justice Rehnquist abstaining.  See Sylvania, 433 U.S. 
at 37.  Leegin was a 5–4 decision, with Justices Breyer (probably the most 
economically sophisticated member of the Court), Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg dissenting.  See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880. 
In addition to alleviating the free-rider impediment to increased 
interbrand competition, the Court discussed the potential of RPM to lower entry 
barriers and to encourage resellers to engage in nonprice promotional efforts 
whether or not they were discouraged by free riders.  See id. at 890–92. 
It should also be noted that, since Sylvania, the Court has become clearer 
with respect to the relative importance of interbrand and intrabrand 
competition, indicating that interbrand competition has a significantly higher 
priority.  See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 
164, 180–81 (2006) (“Interbrand competition . . . is the ‘primary concern of 
antitrust law.’” (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 50 n.19)). 
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consequences of RPM.38  For example, in an industry populated by a 
small number of producers or manufacturers, the ability to engage 
in successful price fixing could be affected by the ability to control 
price cutting by resellers.39  In addition, RPM might be established 
at the behest of a cartel of retailers desiring to avoid price 
competition independent of any positive effects on the interbrand 
market.40  Similarly, a particularly powerful retailer could use its 
leverage as a buyer to insist on RPM, as the Court put it, “to 
forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs.”41  
Compared to its decision in Sylvania, the Court expressed itself in 
ways that suggest greater concern that vertical price restraints have 
greater anticompetitive potential than nonprice restraints.  
Consequently, the Leegin Court cautioned that “the potential 
anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be 
ignored or underestimated.”42  As already noted, it is impossible at 
this juncture to know whether RPM will evolve to be de facto per se 
legal.  The cautionary language in Leegin, however, invites or even 
instructs lower courts to ensure this does not occur. 
II.  DR. MILES’S ORPHANS AND THE CONCEPT OF AN AGREEMENT ON 
PRICE 
A. Pre-Sylvania Cases: Is There an Agreement? 
As noted in the Introduction, prior to Sylvania the Supreme 
Court sought to define Dr. Miles’s parameters in a way that fully 
condemned even indirect ways to accomplish RPM.  The cases 
actually concern two matters that can be intertwined.  First, was 
there an agreement?43  Second, did the agreement pertain to the 
resale price?44  Five cases in the pre-Sylvania period are particularly 
important. 
Eight years after Dr. Miles, the Court began deciding a series of 
 38. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94. 
 39. Id. at 892. 
 40. Id. at 893. 
 41. Id.  Presumably the Court means that there would be little incentive for 
a retailer to seek lower costs if it could not then compete on the basis of price.  
Of course this would not mean the more innovative retailer would not profit by 
virtue of its lower costs.  The Court also suggests that a powerful manufacturer 
would use RPM as a way to discourage its resellers from selling the products of 
the manufacturer’s competitors.  Id. at 894. 
More recently, in McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 
466–68, (E.D. Pa. 2009), the claim was that a large retailer pressured 
manufacturers to impose RPM to limit competition by online discounters. 
 42. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894. 
 43. The fact of an agreement is necessitated by section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 44. For most of this period nonprice vertical restraints were not per se 
unlawful, meaning that classification of the activity as price or nonprice was 
critical.  See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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cases that fell squarely in the area of form versus substance.  The 
first of these was United States v. Colgate & Co., which was 
inconsistent with the theme of protecting the per se rule and became 
something of a judicial headache for many years.45  The decision is 
generally cited for the proposition that a manufacturer can 
announce a resale price and refuse to deal with or terminate a 
reseller that does not adhere to that price.  In more specific terms, 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, announcements and refusals to 
deal with those who do not adhere to those prices does not establish 
the existence of an agreement.46
What Colgate reflects about the Court’s view of RPM is unclear.  
On one hand, the outcome is driven by the fact that section 1 does 
require an agreement.  On the other hand, the actual practice of one 
party announcing terms and another one adhering to those terms, 
from the perspective of basic contract law, may very well establish 
the existence of an agreement.  The proper interpretation of Colgate 
is made difficult because it deals with a criminal charge and the 
interpretation of an indictment.47  The indictment listed a variety of 
Colgate’s practices that would fall short of an agreement.48  It also 
listed practices that did indicate the existence of an agreement.  
Thus, according to the indictment, Colgate was involved in 
“investigation and discovery of those not adhering [to resale prices 
and] requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of 
future adherence to prices, which were often given.”49  For some 
unexplained reason, despite this language, the trial court concluded 
that the indictment included “no charge . . . that any contract was 
entered into by . . . the defendant, and any of its retail customers.”50  
Later in the same opinion the trial court said, “In the view taken by 
the court, the indictment here fairly presents the question of 
whether a manufacturer . . .is subject to criminal 
prosecution . . . because he agrees with his wholesale and  retail 
customers, upon prices.”51
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court viewed its task as 
“ascertain[ing], as accurately as may be, what interpretation the 
trial court placed on the indictment.”52  In examining the indictment 
and the trial court opinion, the Court concluded that ultimately the 
trial court had interpreted the indictment to mean no more than the 
defendant had requested adherence to price, sometimes in advance, 
and then refused to sell to those who did not adhere to those 
 45. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306–07 (1919). 
 46. See id. at 307. 
 47. See id. at 302. 
 48. See id. at 302–04. 
 49. Id. at 303. 
 50. Id. at 304. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 306. 
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prices.53  This was a questionable interpretation given that the 
indictment also said dealers were requested to promise they would 
adhere to the resale prices and in many instances provided that 
assurance.54  In fact, in still another passage, the trial court 
observed: 
The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no 
averment is made of any contract or agreement having been 
entered into whereby the defendant, the manufacturer, and his 
customers, bound themselves to enhance and maintain prices, 
further than is involved in the circumstances that the 
manufacturer, the defendant here, refused to sell to persons 
who would not resell at indicated prices, and that certain 
retailers made purchases on this condition . . . .55
One reading of this passage, offered by Professor Thomas Arthur, is 
not that there is no agreement but that the only way to enforce the 
agreement was to refuse to supply.56
In many respects the lower court and the Supreme Court’s 
definition of what constituted an agreement would not survive a 
more modern analysis.  This can be understood by thinking of the 
announcement, “I will only sell to you if you will not resell for less 
than $10.00.”  The retailer thereafter adheres to the price.  Under 
basic contract law principles, the outcome could easily be squared 
with the existence of an implied agreement.  The initial assertion is 
an offer indicating the actions required of the offeree in order to 
ensure performance by the offeror.  Under the facts of the case, it 
does not appear that retailers adhering to resale prices did so 
because it spontaneously occurred to them to do so.  They were, in 
fact, complying in order to be assured of the reciprocal performance 
by the supplier.57  Yet the Colgate Court and the lower court viewed 
the manufacturer as doing no more than exercising its rights to 
decide with whom it will deal.58  The problem is that the company 
went further than merely exercising its right to decide with whom it 
will deal—the Court’s choice was based on reciprocity by the 
resellers.  Colgate thus can just as easily be read as exempting 
certain types of agreements from its prohibition of RPM as it can be 
read as a reaction to unilateral action.  Indeed, in 1949 one 
commentator remarked, “The Colgate case virtually invited resale 
price maintenance.”59
 53. Id. at 306–07. 
 54. Id. at 303. 
 55. Id. at 305. 
 56. See Arthur, supra note 6, at 463. 
 57. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303–04. 
 58. See id. at 305–07.  Of course the unilateral right to determine with 
whom one will deal is a fundamental characteristic of all contracts.  See 17A 
AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 222 (2004). 
 59. Comment, Refusals To Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE. 
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It is hard not to see the Colgate decision as being more trouble 
than it was worth.  In fact, for three years in a row beginning in 
1920, the Supreme Court attempted to “clarify” Colgate without 
conceding that it was simply wrong.60  Ultimately, however, in 1964 
the Court appeared to relent and characterized Colgate as a case in 
which it “assumed” there was no agreement.61  Under that 
interpretation of the decision, the outcome is a necessary one.  In the 
meantime, clarification was required because the Dr. Miles/Colgate 
distinction was far from obvious, especially to those attempting to 
apply basic contract law principles.  In fact, to some courts, the only 
distinction appeared to be whether the agreement was in writing.62
In United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc.,63 a 1920 case, the 
lower court described Colgate as a case in which a “combination or 
conspiracy” was “clearly disclosed”64 and further observed that the 
difference between Dr. Miles and Colgate was a “distinction without 
a difference.”65  The lower court’s description of the Colgate facts 
seemed directly on point: 
In the Colgate Case the predetermined purpose of the maker, 
known to all the wholesalers and retailers, was to market a 
product at certain fixed prices.  Every wholesaler or retail 
dealer who acquiesced therein or acted in furtherance of the 
accomplishment of that purpose made himself a member of a 
conspiracy.66
In light of Colgate, and faced with perhaps even more 
compelling evidence of an agreement, the lower court felt 
constrained to rule that there had been no violation of the Sherman 
Act.67
L.J. 1121, 1127 (1948). 
 60. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 451–52 (1922).  
It does not appear that the Court had changed with respect to its conviction 
that RPM was per se unlawful.  See id.  Instead it just seemed unwilling to 
revisit Colgate in a manner that might be interpreted as dropping the 
agreement requirement.  See id. 
 61. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964). 
 62. See, e.g., Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. at 451 (“The Circuit Court of 
Appeals was of opinion that the only difference between the price-fixing 
condemned as unlawful in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373, and the price-fixing plan embodied in the Beech-Nut policy was that in the 
former case there was an agreement in writing, while in this case . . . the plan 
depended upon a tacit understanding . . . .”); United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, 
Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919), rev’d, 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (“I can see no 
real difference upon the facts between the Dr. Miles Medical Co. Case and the 
Colgate Co. Case.  The only difference is that in the former the 
arrangement . . . was put in writing . . . .”). 
 63. 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 
 64. A. Schrader’s Son, 264 F. at 180. 
 65. Id. at 183. 
 66. Id. at 184. 
 67. See id. at 185.  Interestingly, this holding placed the government in the 
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The Supreme Court, in a somewhat tersely worded opinion, 
reversed the lower court,68 noting that the defendants in Schrader 
had gone beyond the actions found in Colgate.69  Once again, the 
distinction was between announcing a policy then exercising 
unilateral rights and the existence of actual agreements.70
A year later the Court was required to clarify the issue again in 
Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., a civil case involving the 
effort by Cudahy to control the resale price of Old Dutch Cleanser.71  
The case first arose in the period between Dr. Miles and Colgate and 
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff.72  The case then reached 
the court of appeals after Colgate, and the decision was reversed.73  
The jury instruction was to the effect that an agreement can be 
inferred from repeated announcements by the manufacturer of the 
resale price and cooperation by the resellers by virtue of adherence 
to that price.74  The appellate court reversed, noting that because 
there was no formal written or oral agreement and, in light of 
Colgate, there should have been a directed verdict for the 
defendant.75  The Supreme Court affirmed, but not without noting 
that under Colgate and A. Schrader’s Son, which was also decided 
by that point, no formal agreement was necessary.76  Thus, an 
agreement “might be implied from a course of dealing or other 
circumstances.”77  Nevertheless, the Court held that an instruction 
that permitted the finder of fact to infer an agreement existed from 
repeated announcements and adherence to the resale price was 
incorrect.78
The next year the issue was considered yet again in FTC v. 
Beech-Nut Packing Co.79  Beech-Nut had a practice of announcing 
resale prices and refusing to sell to those who did not adhere to 
those prices.80  After “declarations, assurances, statements, 
position of arguing that there was a meaningful distinction between the efforts 
by the manufacturers in Dr. Miles and Colgate.  See id. at 183–84.
 68. A. Schrader’s Son, 252 U.S. at 100. 
 69. Id. at 98–100. 
 70. See id. at 99–100. 
 71. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 209 (1921). 
 72. See id. at 209–10. 
 73. See id. at 210. 
 74. Id. at 210–11. 
 75. Id. at 210. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 211.  Three Justices dissented, arguing that the repeated 
announcements and subsequent adherence to the announced resale prices 
would at least raise a question of fact to which the jury should be permitted to 
respond.  Id. at 218.  This view is more consistent with contract law principles.  
For example, it would be a relatively simple matter for the offer to be viewed as 
“I will sell to you as long as you resell for no less than $2.00,” after which an 
acceptance is found in the fact that the buyer resells for no less than $2.00. 
 79. 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
 80. Id. at 447–48. 
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promises, or similar expressions” that the prices would be adhered 
to, the dealer would be reinstated.81  The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) had issued a cease and desist order on this practice.82  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
distinction between Dr. Miles and the policy in question was that 
Dr. Miles involved a written agreement while the agreements in the 
case before the court were tacit.83  It noted that there was no 
substantive distinction.84  It reversed the FTC, reasoning that the 
case was governed by Colgate.85  In effect, if there was no agreement 
in Colgate, the Beech-Nut policy also could not be held to involve an 
agreement. 
Referring to both Schrader’s Son and Cudahy Packing, the 
Supreme Court pointed out that the difference was not between 
written agreements and tacit agreements.86  Instead, the Court 
noted that in Colgate it responded to a lower court’s interpretation 
of an indictment.87  According to the Court, the lower court in 
Colgate had found that the company did no more than announce 
under what conditions it would sell to resellers, but no agreement 
existed that obligated those resellers to observe the resale price once 
they possessed the goods.88  After seeming to clarify Colgate, the 
remainder of the Court’s reasoning is less than clear.  The Court 
noted that the FTC had not found that Beech-Nut’s conduct did not 
constitute a “contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed.”89  
On the other hand, the Court reasoned that “The specific facts found 
show suppression of the freedom of competition by methods in which 
the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and 
customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements express or 
implied intended to accomplish the same purpose.”90  The distinction 
between an agreement, express or implied; suppression of freedom 
that is as effective as agreements; and the “unilateral” action in 
Colgate was never made by the Court. 
In fact, the distinction, if it existed, would have been 
extraordinarily fine because Beech-Nut conditioned sales on the 
receipt of assurances that resale price would be observed.  There 
appears no doubt that the Court desired to preserve Colgate but 
precisely what freedom those who desired to fix resale price enjoyed 
was exceptionally narrow.  In the words of a writer at the time, 
 81. Id. at 450. 
 82. Id. at 443–44. 
 83. Id. at 451. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 452–53. 
 87. Id. at 451. 
 88. Id. at 451–52. 
 89. Id. at 455. 
 90. Id. 
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[W]hatever the present status of the Colgate case, one thing 
seems clear—the passage to the legal methods of that case, 
which the Court has assumed to preserve between the Scylla 
and Charybdis of the subsequent decisions, is narrow and 
dangerous, and the manufacturer who would take advantage 
of the passage will need a truly skilful pilot.91
The final pre-Sylvania chapter of the Dr. Miles/Colgate saga 
came in a 1959 case, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co,92 a decision 
that came close to overruling Colgate and, from some perspectives, 
did so.93  Parke, Davis & Co. sold drugs to both wholesalers and 
retailers.94  Retailers acquired the drug from wholesalers and, in the 
case of large orders, from Parke, Davis & Co. directly.95  Parke, 
Davis & Co. announced resale prices for both wholesalers and 
retailers and warned that it would not sell to those who did not 
adhere to the price.96  In addition, the wholesalers were told they 
would not be supplied if any of the retailers they sold to did not 
observe the minimum price.97  The wholesalers would report the 
names of retailers violating the policy and Parke, Davis & Co. would 
terminate deliveries.98
The lower court determined that Parke, Davis & Co. activity fell 
within Colgate and ruled against the government.99  The Supreme 
Court reversed once again, attempting to distinguish ultimately 
Colgate as well as Dr. Miles from the activities of Parke, Davis & 
Co.100  This time, according to the Court, 
 91. Comment, Price Maintenance and the Beechnut Decision, 31 YALE L.J. 
650, 655 (1922).  In the words of another commentator, “It requires Herculean 
efforts to square [the decisions in Cudahy and Schrader’s Sons], and the Dr. 
Miles decision, with the right to select customers, recognized by Colgate.”  
Walter Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967, 
980 (1955). 
 92. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
 93. See, e.g., Recent Case, Sales to Wholesalers Conditioned on Their 
Refusal To Sell to Price Cutting Retailers Who Are Informed of Such a Policy 
Constitutes a Combination and Conspiracy, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1237, 1242 
(1960).  In addition, the dissenters in Parke, Davis & Co. seemed to feel the 
majority had effectively overruled Colgate.  See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 
49 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 94. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 31–32. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 32. 
 97. Id. at 33. 
 98. When confronted with the problem of price cutters, Parke, Davis & Co. 
consulted counsel who advised them that “we can lawfully say ‘we will sell you 
only so long as you observe such minimum retail prices’ but cannot say ‘we will 
sell you only if you agree to observe such minimum retail prices.’”  Id. at 33 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Parke, Davis & Co.’s efforts met with 
limited success in that some retailers refused to adhere to the minimum price 
and were terminated.  They were reinstated—temporarily—when they stopped 
advertising discount prices.  Id. at 35–36.
 99. Id. at 36. 
 100. Id. at 38, 45–46. 
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[A]n unlawful combination is not just as such arises from a 
price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a 
combination is also organized if the producer secures 
adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond 
his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe 
his announced policy.101
In this case, the excessive conduct was evidently the fact that Parke, 
Davis & Co. “used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order 
to elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to 
retailers.”102  The majority so narrowed Colgate that three dissenting 
Justices103 and one concurring Justice104 seemed to believe that the 
Court had effectively overturned Colgate.  Exactly how much 
Colgate was narrowed is hard to assess.  It appears, however, that 
at least for a time, any agreement with any party—even though that 
party had no interest in the success of the price-fixing efforts—
would exceed Colgate’s limits.105
As noted earlier, the string of cases from Dr. Miles to Parke, 
Davis & Co. represents the pre-Sylvania approach of the Court to 
RPM.  RPM was per se illegal, and the definition of an agreement 
was broadly defined.  Dr. Miles, of course, is no longer applicable, 
but the cases that represented the Court’s struggle to contain Dr. 
Miles remain.  Although perhaps not correct as an economic matter, 
the Court seemed to be concerned that what it viewed as 
anticompetitive agreements would escape detection.  In assessing 
them, there are two important factors to note.  First, the continuing 
importance of the Colgate line of cases is not simply dependent on 
Leegin but on the post-1977 cases in which RPM was alleged.  The 
next Subpart is devoted to these cases. 
The second thing to note is that, although all the cases dealt 
with RPM, they dealt with a specific element of an RPM claim—
whether there was an agreement.  The agreement element is also 
necessary in the context of all vertical restraints, not simply those 
related to price.  Thus, for a ten-year span these cases potentially 
 101. Id. at 43. 
 102. Id. at 45. 
 103. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented, arguing that 
the Court had “done no less than send to its demise the Colgate doctrine.”  Id. at 
49 (Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). 
 104. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 105. In the pre-Sylvania period, this is consistent with other announcements 
by the Court.  For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), 
overruled on other grounds by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), a 
newspaper publisher sought to stop one carrier from charging above a desired 
maximum price.  In order to accomplish this it hired another party to solicit 
away the carrier’s customers.  The party would not, however, take over the 
route and charge only the agreement maximum.  In other words, it ultimately 
had little or no interest in the subsequent maximum price fixing scheme.  
Nevertheless, the Court held that the agreement with that party could satisfy 
the agreement requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 149–50. 
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had increased importance.  In the period between 1967 and 1977, 
nonprice vertical restraints joined RPM in the per se unlawful 
category.106  Thus, the law during that period would have meant that 
simply announcing one’s policy with respect to nonprice restraints 
would have been permissible, but an agreement, implied or express, 
or any “arrangement” that exceeded Colgate would have meant 
liability under section 1.  In the post-1977 period, we now know that, 
under the rule of reason, it is virtually unheard of for a plaintiff to 
prevail on a claim based on nonprice restraint.107  In effect, 
regardless of the difficulty or ease of showing an agreement existed, 
the plaintiffs lose and the agreement element has become of minor 
importance.  That is not to say, as will be discussed below,108 that 
the same is true of RPM. 
B. Post-Sylvania: What Does It Mean To Fix Prices? 
It appears it did not take the Supreme Court long after its 
footnote in Sylvania to have second thoughts about the legal status 
of RPM.  In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,109 decided 
seven years later, the Court confronted the problems of a dual 
approach to vertical restraints.  Price restraints were per se 
unlawful while nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule 
of reason.  The problem was that it is not always easy to detect the 
difference—particularly if one applies anything other than the 
narrowest possible definition of RPM. 
In this respect there is a formalistic and a substantive 
approach.  As a substantive matter, RPM refers to any agreement 
that stifles price competition among intrabrand competitors.  This 
broader definition would be consistent with the Court’s definition of 
price fixing in the context of horizontal arrangements.  In that area 
the standard is to prohibit any action that has the effect of “raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” price.110  A more 
formalistic view is that price fixing does not occur unless the parties 
agree on an actual price.  If that formalistic approach were applied 
to horizontal restraints, an agreement to restrict output,111 
discontinue credit terms,112 or not to engage in competitive bidding113 
would not be price fixing because prices could still differ from seller 
 106. See infra notes 191–98 and accompanying text. 
 107. The exceptions are quite limited.  See generally, e.g., Graphic Prods. 
Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 
622 F.2d 1068 (2nd Cir. 1980); Moecker v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 
1291 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
 108. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 109. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 110. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 220, 223 (1940). 
 111. This was in fact the activity in Socony-Vacuum.  Id. at 220. 
 112. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per 
curiam). 
 113. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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to seller.  All of these have been held to be price fixing114 in the 
horizontal context but would not be in the vertical context under a 
formalistic approach. 
In Monsanto, resellers complained that Spray-Rite, a 
competitor, was selling at discounted prices.115  Monsanto 
terminated the resale contract with Spray-Rite, which claimed that 
the termination was in furtherance of a per se unlawful agreement 
to fix resale prices.116  Spray-Rite prevailed at the trial court level 
and Monsanto appealed.117  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, if there had been complaints about 
price discounting and then termination, a jury would be entitled to 
infer the existence of a vertical agreement on price between 
Monsanto and the complaining resellers.118  Monsanto, on the other 
hand, argued that the termination was due to Spray-Rite’s failure to 
hire trained salesmen and to promote sales.119  The dilemma was 
that even this requirement could cause resale prices to increase and 
possibly stabilize. 
The Court was faced with the inevitable intertwining of two 
issues raised by section 1 of the Sherman Act.  First, of course, was 
whether there was an agreement between Monsanto and its 
resellers.  After Sylvania, simply showing the existence of a vertical 
agreement was not enough to establish a per se violation.120  This 
meant addressing the second issue: distinguishing price from 
nonprice agreements.  This second step was necessary to avoid the 
error of condemning pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints 
that also had the effect of raising resale prices.  Put differently, a 
view that priority was to be placed on discouraging RPM would 
mean adopting a policy that could chill lawful and pro-competitive 
efforts to employ nonprice vertical restraints.  On the other hand, 
affording a wide berth to nonvertical restraints would mean that 
RPM agreements could go undetected.121  Perhaps reflecting the 
view that it was hard to distinguish the effects of price and nonprice 
restraints,122 the Court adopted a policy of decreasing the likelihood 
of condemning any pro-competitive restraints.123  It did this not by 
 114. See supra notes 91–93. 
 115. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 758–59 (1984). 
 116. Id. at 757. 
 117. See id. at 757–58. 
 118. Id. at 758. 
 119. Id. at 757. 
 120. The Court expressly declined a request to remove RPM from the per se 
category.  Id. at 752 n.7. 
 121. The choice is between the mistake of condemning pro-competitive 
activities and the mistake of allowing anticompetitive activities. 
 122. In fact, the Court observes, “the economic effect of . . . unilateral and 
concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice 
restrictions . . . is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical.”  Monsanto, 
465 U.S. at 762. 
 123. Id. at 764. 
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clarifying the distinction between price and nonprice restraints, but 
by raising the standard for plaintiffs to the requirement of showing 
an agreement existed.  Consequently, the Court held that in order to 
avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs would be required to present 
evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer 
and nonterminated distributors were acting independently.”124
The choice the Court made here with respect to the way it 
framed and responded to the issue is noteworthy.  The complaint 
alleged that the defendant had conspired to fix prices.125  At the trial 
court level, the issue was precisely that, with the jury instructed 
that RPM was per se unlawful.  The Court could have responded 
with a narrow holding that required courts to instruct juries about 
the distinction to be made between price and nonprice agreements.  
Instead, it opted to address the arguably broader issue of whether 
an agreement existed at all.126  In Monsanto, the alleged agreement 
was to fix prices, but the Court’s decision was not constrained to 
price fixing only.127  Instead, it raised the bar with respect to all 
vertical restraints.128
The last of the Court’s post-Sylvania decisions that undercut 
Dr. Miles and the Court’s subsequent assertion in Sylvania that 
RPM was different from nonprice vertical restraints was Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.129  The theme in the 
case was similar to Monsanto in that it was made necessary by the 
different treatment of vertical nonprice and vertical price restraints.  
Business Electronics was initially the only seller of Sharp’s 
calculators in Houston, Texas.  An additional seller was appointed 
and eventually complained to Sharp that Business Electronics was 
pricing below the minimum prices suggested by Sharp.130  
Eventually, Business Electronics was terminated and claimed that 
Sharp had engaged in RPM.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that per se unlawful RPM existed only “if there is an 
expressed or implied agreement to set resale prices at some level.”131
What distinguished Business Electronics from Monsanto is that 
in Business Electronics, defendant Sharp made no effort to argue 
that it had imposed nonprice vertical restraints on the non-
terminated reseller that would have raised its costs.  In other words, 
there was no argument that a restriction of RPM would actually 
have an impact on nonprice vertical restraints. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 757. 
 126. Id. at 763–65. 
 127. See id. at 765–68. 
 128. Interestingly, the Court then went on to find that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a holding that Monsanto had actually entered into per se 
unlawful pricing agreements.  Id. at 765–66. 
 129. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 130. Id. at 721. 
 131. Id. at 720. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, once again 
noting its concerns that the policies and economic priorities 
announced in Sylvania would be thwarted by a broad definition of 
price fixing.132  It noted that nearly any nonprice vertical agreement 
could be cast as one having an impact on resale prices.133  The Court 
also explained that the rationale for prohibiting RPM was that it 
could facilitate cartelization.134  In other words, RPM was to be 
avoided not because it was inherently anticompetitive but because it 
could be a means to accomplish horizontal price fixing.  The Court 
then used this premise as a means of narrowing Dr. Miles.  
Accordingly, it reasoned that if the principal concern was the 
creation of a cartel, this outcome would be less likely if the 
manufacturers and resellers, who were instruments toward this 
end, did not have agreements on actual price levels.135  This idea is 
better understood by an example.  Suppose all major oil refiners 
would like to engage in horizontal price fixing.  If they all resell to 
service stations that are engaged in fierce competition, it will be 
more difficult to maintain the effectiveness of the cartel at the 
refinery level.  There would be constant pressure from retailers for 
lower prices, and lower prices by one set of retailers may lead to the 
conclusion by other refiners that a competing refiner is cheating on 
the cartel.  In effect, each member of the cartel can stabilize the 
cartel by agreeing with retailers on resale prices.  In the Court’s 
view, this objective could only be achieved if there were an actual 
agreement on price itself, something that was absent under the facts 
of Business Electronics.136
Business Electronics, for all practical purposes, ended the reign 
of Dr. Miles.137  After Business Electronics, evidently the only way to 
engage in unlawful RPM was to not only have just an agreement 
stabilizing resale price, but also have an agreement on the actual 
price level.  Even before Business Electronics, threats and 
subsequent capitulation by resellers had already escaped the 
prohibition of Dr. Miles. After Business Electronics, it was clear that 
agreements except those pegging a specific price were also exempt.  
Indeed, after Monsanto and Business Electronics, findings that firms 
have engaged in per se unlawful RPM are rare.138
 132. Id. at 726, 736. 
 133. Id. at 727–28. 
 134. Id. at 725. 
 135. Id. at 727. 
 136. See id. at 721–27. 
 137. Forty-two state attorneys general filed briefs urging the Court to 
reverse the Fifth Circuit.  Id. at 718 n.*. 
 138. One particular case in the last twenty years drew a great deal of 
attention because it did address RPM.  See Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. 981-0386, 
2000 WL 250227 (F.T.C. Mar. 6, 2000).  The FTC order in Nine West was 
modified after Leegin.  See Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410 
(F.T.C. May 6, 2008).
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C. Agreements Post-Leegin 
Leegin does not expressly overrule any of the cases discussed 
thus far.  Technically, they do not address the issue of the per se or 
rule of reason status of RPM.  What Leegin does do, in a way that is 
hard to ignore, is call into question the relevance and necessity of 
these cases.  In fact, it may be that without a reinterpretation of 
these cases, they actually impede the more economically sensitive 
approach Leegin seems to offer. 
The explanation for this requires once again noting that the pre-
Leegin cases fall into two categories.  The pre-Sylvania period was 
marked by an effort to narrow as much as possible the 
circumstances under which RPM could be imposed subject to the 
Sherman Act requirement that an agreement must be involved and 
the Court’s reluctance to expressly overrule Colgate.139  The process 
is the source of considerable irony.  While narrowing the scope of 
methods allowed to establish resale pricing, the Court actually 
stopped far short of what might have been expected.  Under the 
guise of upholding the requirement that an agreement be involved, 
it established the Colgate doctrine and either misread the actions of 
the lower court or ignored basic contract principles concerning 
implied agreements or understandings.140  After Sylvania, either 
because the Court recognized the inconsistency of different 
treatment of RPM and nonprice vertical restraint or as a method of 
protecting possible pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints, it 
changed course.  With cases that seem to pull in opposite directions, 
it is quite difficult to confidently predict the future importance of the 
cases. 
That, however, may not be the most important point.  The most 
important point is that those two lines of cases may give rise to a 
new approach to the agreement question.  To understand why, 
consider the types of antitrust errors the Court sought to avoid. The 
first group of cases—pre-Sylvania—were consistent with a view that 
RPM was anticompetitive, and the error to be avoided was to allow 
indirect methods of setting resale prices.  As noted below, it is not 
clear that the actual decisions by the Court were the most well-
considered with respect to achieving this goal, but that does appear 
to be the focus.  Now, of course, that premise for the treatment of 
the agreement issue is no longer required because there is no need 
to protect the per se rule. 
The second group of cases reflects an effort to avoid the error of 
mistaking a nonprice restraint for a price restraint.  The theory was 
to protect the possibly pro-competitive nonprice vertical restraints 
from inadvertent per se treatment.  Now, that too is no longer 
relevant.  Even if a nonprice vertical agreement is classified as a 
 139. See supra Part II.A. 
 140. See supra notes 43–62 and accompanying text. 
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pricing agreement, the competitive assessment will be the same.  In 
effect, both the pre- and post-Sylvania cases were designed to avoid 
errors that Leegin makes unlikely to occur.  The point is that the 
error-avoiding goals of these two lines of cases are no longer 
relevant. 
Further decreasing the relevance of the cases that sought to 
clarify when an agreement existed is that there is little reason for a 
firm to attempt to conceal vertical agreements.  This might be 
compared to the pre-Leegin era in which a firm attempting to 
establish pro-competitive RPM would be wise not to do it at all, to do 
it indirectly, or to conceal it.  Now concealment would seem to make 
sense in two instances only.  First, the firm may believe that its 
RPM efforts are likely to be correctly or mistakenly viewed as 
anticompetitive under the rule of reason.  Second, concealing the 
agreement may mean it raises the cost of discovery, which, at the 
margin, lowers the likelihood that a violation will be found to be 
unlawful. 
In order to further assess the proper role of the agreement 
analysis post-Leegin, it is also useful to recall that the Leegin Court 
appeared to be more sanguine about the pro-competitive effects of 
RPM as opposed to nonvertical restraints.  In this respect, it 
admonished that “the potential anticompetitive consequences of 
vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.”141  
In fact, as discussed above,142 the Court lists a number of ways RPM 
may have little to do with increasing interbrand competition.143  As a 
complement to the actual assessment of effects of RPM, one 
important step is to apply principles to the question of whether an 
agreement exists that are more consistent with contract law. 
What this analysis suggests is that the agreement analysis 
should not be utilized to shelter vertical agreements.  Instead, the 
emphasis should be shifted to the substantive economic analysis of 
the impact.  More specifically, the Court should be more receptive to 
evidence of implicit agreements that can be inferred from 
suggestions (offers) and compliance (acceptance).  In addition, while 
there should be some evidence to exclude the possibility of unilateral 
action, the idea that price fixing must be narrowly defined so as to 
include an agreement on an actual price, has no positive impact, and 
may serve simply to preclude the substantive scrutiny Leegin calls 
for. 
To this point there are no cases in which a lower court has had 
to revisit the issue of what is required in order for the existence of 
an agreement to be shown.  One of the few post-Leegin RPM cases is 
 141. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894 
(2007).  The Court also noted that “courts . . . have to be diligent in eliminating 
[the] anticompetitive uses [of RPM] from the market.”  Id. at 897. 
 142. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 143. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94. 
W06_HARRISON 10/18/2010  11:49:12 AM 
1146 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.144  The allegation in the case 
was that the defendant, Toys “R” Us, doing business as Babies “R” 
Us, had conspired with manufacturers of baby products to fix the 
resale price of these products.145  The manufacturers were selling to 
Internet discounters who were undercutting the prices offered at 
Babies “R” Us retail outlets.146  Babies “R” Us was a powerful 
enough buyer to make demands on these manufacturers.147  Indeed, 
it is noteworthy that the scheme fit precisely one of the possibilities 
that the Leegin Court had cautioned lower courts to be sensitive to.  
As described by the Leegin Court: “A dominant retailer . . . might 
request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in 
distribution that decreases costs.  A manufacturer might consider it 
has little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s demands for 
vertical price restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access 
to the retailer’s distribution network.”148
The Babyage.com court noted that the plaintiff’s theory involved 
two agreements.149  One was between Babies “R” Us and the 
manufacturers and the other between the manufacturers and the 
resellers who were originally discounting.150  With respect to the 
first agreement, the court applied the Monsanto rule of requiring 
sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility of unilateral action.151  
It held that plaintiffs had stated a claim for conspiracy based on 
evidence that (1) Babies “R” Us was large enough to place the 
manufacturers under duress, (2) Babies “R” Us had threatened each 
manufacturer with a loss of business if the prices of their other 
customers were not controlled, and (3) the manufacturers had 
pursued a parallel course of action that would not be in their 
individual self-interest unless all manufacturers cooperated.152  The 
standard applied by the court may reflect some of the loosening 
described here.  For example, the scenario could be trimmed to its 
basics—Babies “R” Us announced a policy of not buying from 
manufacturers who did not control the resale prices of its other 
 144. 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 145. See id. at 579. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893–94 (2007) (citing THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR. 
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 31 
(1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/233105.pdf). 
 149. Babyage.com, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 582. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 582–83.  In another opinion involving class-certification issues, 
the arrangements between Babies “R” Us and the manufacturers are described 
in a manner that is more consistent with express agreements.  See McDonough 
v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468–72 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  Since these 
arrangements were, however, pre-Leegin, it seems more likely that they were 
the results of efforts to “influence” resale prices as opposed to reaching 
agreements on resale prices. 
W06_HARRISON 10/18/2010  11:49:12 AM 
2010] DR. MILES’S ORPHANS 1147 
 
retailers.  It is not at all clear that the parallel action analysis of the 
court was correct.  Any manufacturer who refused would lose its 
best customers without regard for the actions of other 
manufacturers.  Nevertheless, from a basic contract law perspective, 
Toys “R” Us made an offer that was accepted.  The fact that it could 
be described as unilateral action is beside the point.  In fact, every 
contract is in some sense an instance of unilateral action. 
The second set of agreements—between the manufacturers and 
their other customers—according to the court, was also adequately 
alleged.153  It is not clear whether these agreements were express or 
the result of announcements and threats to discontinue sales if 
minimum prices were not observed.154  Given that the events 
occurred prior to Leegin, it is not surprising that the defendants 
argued that the outcome was not the result of agreements but was, 
instead, protected by Colgate.155  Nevertheless, the scenario can be 
seen as a series of vertical agreements between Babies “R” Us and 
its manufacturers/suppliers that led to vertical agreements between 
those manufacturers and their customers.  Ultimately the court 
avoided the formalistic line-drawing found in pre-Sylvania cases to 
avoid one type of antitrust error, on the one hand, and in Monsanto 
and Business Electronics to avoid another type of error.  Adherence 
to those rules would have served little purpose except to detract the 
analysis from the real question of substantive economic impact. 
III.  THE CONSIGNMENT QUESTION 
A. Pre-Leegin 
One issue that was prominent in the wake of Dr. Miles was 
whether a manufacturer could maintain control over prices by using 
a middleman or agent who did not take title to the goods.  Again, as 
 153. Babyage.com, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 583. 
 154. The more detailed descriptions found in the class-certification opinion 
are somewhat ambiguous.  See McDonough, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 469–72.  
Nevertheless, since these arrangements were pre-Leegin, it seems likely that 
they were the result of announcements and threats by the manufacturers. 
Interestingly, Toys “R” Us sought the same assurances from 
manufacturers of toys.  See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th 
Cir. 2000).  Instead of price restraints, however, Toys “R” Us demanded 
limitations on the amount sold to warehouse clubs.  Facing resistance from 
manufacturers who were concerned about limiting their own sales unless other 
manufacturers did the same, Toys “R” Us eventually reached agreements with 
each manufacturer on the condition that other manufacturers complied.  Id.  
This, according to the FTC, changed the agreement from vertical to horizontal.  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that there was sufficient 
evidence to support this conclusion.  Id. at 935. 
 155. See Defendant Peg Perego’s Joinder in Motion to Dismiss of Toys “R” 
Us, Inc., Babies “R” Us, Inc., and Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc. at 2, Babyage.com, 
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (Nos. 2:05-cv-
06792-AB, 2:06-cv-00242-AB), 2006 WL 5295345. 
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in the Colgate line of cases, the theme is to avoid the requirement of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act that there be an agreement to fix 
resale prices.  Initially, the question seems to have an obvious 
answer.  If a firm retains title and uses a network of sales agents, it 
is hardly fixing a resale price because there is no resale.  Indeed, a 
rule that prevents setting the price at which the product would be 
sold for the first time makes little sense.  On the other hand, section 
1 of the Sherman Act can be (and is) broken into two parts.  First, is 
there an agreement?  Second, does the agreement restrain trade?  
Agreements with sales agents and consignees are in fact 
agreements.  In fact, the only relationships that would seem to fall 
outside the reach of the Sherman Act are those involving employees 
or employees of related firms.156  Put differently, the use of agents or 
consignees may not involve a resale but they are still agreements 
and may be anticompetitive. 
Two fairly well-known cases form the basis for discussion of the 
issue.  In United States v. General Electric Co.,157 the defendant sold 
its light bulbs through more than 21,000 agents throughout the 
United States.158  The agents were otherwise wholesalers and 
retailers.159  The Court examined a number of factors, including the 
fact that payment for the bulbs came only after they were resold and 
that General Electric assumed some of the risks associated with the 
lamps, including that of a price decline.160  Nevertheless, “agency” 
was defined broadly as the so-called “agents” bore most of the risks 
of ordinary resellers.161  There can be little doubt that the plan was 
designed to produce the same results as RPM.  But, since there was 
no resale, the arrangement did not fall within the per se 
prohibitions of Dr. Miles.162
General Electric appeared to create a sizeable hole in Dr. Miles’s 
prohibition of RPM.  In 1964, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of 
California,163 the Court revisited the issue and this time applied a 
 156. The plurality of actors is lost when a firm “agrees” with a related firm 
like a subsidiary or parent.  See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 33, at 175–
80. 
 157. 272 U.S. 476 (1926); see generally Adams, supra note 91, at 985–87. 
 158. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 478. 
 159. Id. at 483. 
 160. Id. at 484. 
 161. The agents were responsible for “all expenses in the storage, cartage, 
transportation, handling, sale and distribution of lamps.”  Id. at 482. 
 162. Id. at 486–88.  Interestingly, General Electric had virtually total control 
over the electric light market.  This raises the question of whether the practice, 
had it been held to involve agreements, could have even survived a rule of 
reason analysis. 
 163. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).  Between General Electric and Simpson, the Court 
decided United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), which also dealt 
with the use of so-called agents as a method of controlling price.  In this 
instance, however, the agents were fully independent firms who also sold the 
same product in competition with the defendant.  It was correctly characterized 
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less formalistic approach.  Union Oil supplied gasoline to service 
stations that were designated as “agents.”  Simpson was an 
“agent”/service station operator who was terminated for selling 
gasoline at below a designated price.164  Without overruling General 
Electric, the Court found that the consignment agreement was a 
form of fixing resale prices.165  The decision is not marked by a 
bright-line test for determining when the arrangement involves a 
legitimate consignment and when it does not.166  In fact, Union Oil 
maintained title to the product as was the case in General Electric.  
Critical to the case was the idea that a seller could retain ownership 
but still constitute an entity separate from the party actually 
making the sale, arguably on behalf of the owner.  On the other 
hand, the Court noted the importance of consignments in the 
context of smaller-scale marketing efforts.167
The Court noted a number of factors that pushed Union Oil’s 
practice over the line. First, it referred to the limitations on 
manufacturers created by Parke, Davis & Co. and observed that the 
practice here went beyond a mere announcement and a refusal to 
deal with those who did not comply.168  In addition, according to the 
Court, the consignment arrangement was on the increase169 with the 
likelihood of “destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline.”170  
This particular observation is reminiscent of the warning issued 
more recently in Leegin.171  In addition, the Court indicated that the 
vastness of the arrangement made it in substance, if not form, 
RPM.172  Finally, the Court relied on the extent to which the service 
station owners actually assumed risks.173  In this respect, it offered 
this observation: 
Dealers, like Simpson, are independent businessmen; and they 
have all or most of the indicia of entrepreneurs, except for 
price fixing.  The risk of loss of the gasoline is on them, apart 
from acts of God.  Their return is affected by the rise and fall 
in the market price, their commissions declining as retail 
prices drop.  Practically the only power they have to be wholly 
independent businessmen, whose service depends on their own 
as an elaborate effort to fix prices horizontally. 
 164. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 15. 
 165. See id. at 23–24. 
 166. See generally Albert C. Bender, Consignment Device for Retail Price 
Maintenance Invalidated by Supreme Court, 17 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1965); The 
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 279, 279–82 (1964). 
 167. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 18. 
 168. Id. at 17. 
 169. Id. at 19. 
 170. Id. at 21. 
 171. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
893 (2007). 
 172. Simpson, 377 U.S. at 21–22. 
 173. See id. at 20. 
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initiative and enterprise, is taken from them by the proviso 
that they must sell their gasoline at prices fixed by Union 
Oil.174
The Court went on to distinguish General Electric in an 
unconvincing fashion.  It noted that General Electric, unlike the case 
at hand, dealt with patented goods.175  It discounted this as the 
relevant distinction176 and concluded, rather cryptically, “whatever 
may be said of the General Electric case on its special facts, 
involving patents, it is not apposite to the special fact here.”177  Nine 
years after Simpson, the Justice Department once again challenged 
General Electric’s “consignment” system.  The court hearing the 
case granted summary judgment in favor of the Justice Department 
explaining, “it is plain that under Simpson price fixing is illegal per 
se even when, as here, it is coupled with a consignment agency 
system such as G.E.’s, involving agency agreements valid under 
private contract law.”178
General Electric and Simpson represent what we know about 
the use of consignments and agents to control “resale” prices.179  
Obviously, now that RPM is assessed under the rule of reason, the 
distinction is not as critical as it once was.  Nevertheless, the task of 
solving the puzzle of when an agent is to be regarded as an 
instrument in an effort to control resale prices has been left to the 
lower courts and for the most part they have followed the lead of the 
Supreme Court in Simpson by focusing on the independence of the 
resellers from their supplier.180
Some years after Simpson, Judge Richard Posner attempted to 
articulate a possibly more rational distinction between Simpson and 
legitimate consignments.  First, he aptly stated that the problem in 
its bare bones is how “to reconcile Simpson with the proposition that 
a homeowner does not violate . . . the Sherman Act when he tells his 
broker at what price to sell his home.”181  Judge Posner’s answer is 
 174. Id. at 20–21 (footnote call numbers omitted). 
 175. Id. at 23. 
 176. Id. at 22–23. 
 177. Id. at 23. 
 178. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 179. This does not mean the status of these agreements is unambiguous.  
See generally Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance After 
Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1163, 1177–81. 
 180. See, e.g., Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 181. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986).  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have developed a very broad 
version of how a manufacturer can avoid the per se standard through the use of 
agents.  One lower court in that circuit has interpreted Murray Biscuit reading 
Simpson and a similar case as “narrow holdings prohibiting manufacturers 
from merely labeling dealers and competitors as agents in order ‘to circumvent 
the rule against price fixing.’”  See Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
700 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 
at 1436).  While the lower court quotes Murray Biscuit correctly, it is clear in 
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to ask whether the consignment “has a function other than to 
circumvent the rule against price fixing.”182  This particular 
observation seems to beg the question, and Judge Posner concedes, 
that there is no clear distinction to be made.183  However, an 
important element in the analysis is to assess the number of 
functions the agent provides.  This probably exists along a 
continuum.  If the agent carries no inventory and is but a conduit, it 
is at one end of the continuum.  On the other hand, if the so-called 
agent has substantial overhead, assumes the risk of price increases 
and decreases, and assumes responsibility for transportation, 
delivery, and insurance, it can be seen at the opposite end of the 
continuum.  In those instances, according to Judge Posner, the 
eventual price will be determined largely by the agent’s costs rather 
than by the costs of the goods sold.  In addition, the supplier will be 
less knowledgeable about those costs.184  In this latter case, it is 
unrealistic to view the agent as merely a tool of the supplier, and 
efforts to control the final price are more akin to conventional efforts 
at RPM. 
B. The Post-Leegin Opportunity 
To understand the possible impact of Leegin on the analysis, it 
is useful to focus on what makes the consignment/agency 
arrangement so difficult in the first place.  In this respect it is 
important to recall again the two questions posed by section 1 of the 
Sherman Act: (1) Is there an agreement? (2) Is that agreement about 
price?  In the context of agency and consignment, the answer to the 
first question is “yes” unless the agent is an actual employee.185  
And, the agreement is clearly designed to control the eventual price.  
The problem that was the focus before Leegin was whether or not 
there was a resale.  If there was, the agreement was per se 
unlawful.  On the other hand, if a resale was not involved, there is 
no reason, a priori, that the agreement could not still be 
anticompetitive. 
This focus on form sidetracked the analysis.  From the 
standpoint of antitrust policy, once the agreement threshold has 
been crossed the only relevant question is whether the effect of the 
practice, however labeled, is pro- or anticompetitive.  A finding that 
it was or was not an actual consignment does not answer this 
question.  A close reading of Simpson reveals that the Court was 
clearly on the right track by focusing on substance over form.  
the lower court’s opinion that the “rule against” price fixing to which Judge 
Posner was referring was the per se rule.  See Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 182. Murray Biscuit, 797 F.2d at 1436. 
 183. Id. at 1438. 
 184. See id. at 1438. 
 185. Another option is that the agent is the employee of a related firm. 
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Whether the Court got the answer to the substantive question right 
is, of course, an empirical question that courts of that era were not 
particularly adept at answering.  Still, the bottom-line analysis was 
devoted to whether the net effect of the arrangement was to reduce 
competition in the gasoline market. 
The question now, of course, is whether Leegin alters the 
consignment analysis.  Obviously Leegin does not overturn General 
Electric or Simpson and, at first glance, it may seem not to have any 
impact at all.  On the other hand, a closer look suggests that Leegin 
may prove to be relevant.  At the most obvious level it should make 
the distinction between agent and reseller less important if not 
irrelevant.  Prior to Leegin, that distinction seemed to make the 
difference between a rule of reason analysis and per se illegality.186  
Now, if applied correctly, as long as there is an agreement, whether 
with a purported reseller or an independent agent, the only question 
is the competitive impact.  Of course if RPM now takes the path 
taken by nonprice restraints after Sylvania, this may be the 
equivalent of per se legality regardless of whether a consignment or 
resale is involved. 
The analysis can, however, be taken to another level.  To 
understand why, it is important to reconsider Sylvania.187  Sylvania 
was a direct response to the Court’s decision ten years earlier in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,188 in which nonprice 
vertical restraints were classified as per se unlawful.  In making 
that decision, however, the Court distinguished resale from 
consignments.189  Nonprice vertical restraints involving resale were 
per se unlawful; those involving the use of agents and consignment 
were to be assessed under the rule of reason.190  Not only did 
Sylvania shift nonprice vertical restraints to the rule of reason 
analysis, it abolished this resale/consignment distinction.191  It 
reasoned that the Schwinn Court had provided “no analytical 
support for [the] contrasting positions.”192
When it comes to the agency/resale issue, there is an obvious 
parallel between vertical nonprice restraints and vertical price 
restraints.  Sylvania, in the course of making nonprice restraints 
 186. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379–81 
(1967).  Of course, Schwinn was overruled by Sylvania but only with respect to 
the per se treatment of nonprice restraints.  See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977).  Thus, the agency/resale distinction 
even up until Leegin should have been relevant only with respect to whether 
the practice was assessed under the rule of reason or the per se standard.  
Nevertheless, a rule of reason standard, when applied to vertical restraints, 
seems to work much like a standard of per se legality. 
 187. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text. 
 188. 388 U.S. 365. 
 189. Id. at 378–80. 
 190. Id. at 379–80. 
 191. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54, 57–59. 
 192. Id. at 54. 
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subject to the rule of reason, indicated that consignment sales and 
true resales would be treated under the same standard.193  Properly 
understood, Leegin can play the same role in the context of RPM.  
Prior to Leegin, RPM was per se unlawful while the actual analysis 
of Simpson in many respects mirrors a rule of reason analysis.  In 
other words, what was nominally a determination of when actual 
agents were used, as opposed to when sham agents were involved, 
had a strong substantive element.  One inference from this is that 
the formalistic step of defining whether one is an agent or not is no 
longer relevant.194
What this means is that Leegin provides an opportunity to 
simplify the consignment issue by allowing a court to move directly 
to the issue of competitive impact once an agreement has been 
established.  As long as independent business entities are involved, 
the issues of price and sham agencies become irrelevant.  There is 
little downside risk in doing this.195  The overarching question would 
remain whether the arrangement has an undesirable effect.  If it 
does, the use of a formalistic distinction between consignment and 
nonconsignment hardly advances antitrust policy.  And the 
necessity of using or the temptation to use sham agents would seem 
to decline.  Prior to Leegin, a firm concerned that its efforts to 
control downstream prices would be per se unlawful might conceal 
its objectives by the use of agents.  Even after Simpson, there was 
some probability of gaining a strategic advantage by doing so.  After 
Leegin, however, any agreement automatically goes to a rule of 
reason analysis and an entire mistake-prone step of classification is 
eliminated. 
One post-Leegin case addressed the issue, albeit somewhat 
indirectly, and it missed the opportunity to make use of this more 
streamlined approach.  In Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer 
Corp.,196 the plaintiffs were providers of pest-control services who 
purchased pesticides from distributors.197  At some point, Bayer, the 
manufacturer, decided to sell through “agents” who did not take title 
to the pesticides.198  To do this it did not engage a team of new 
agents but designated its former distributors as “agents.”199  The 
allegation was that the manufacturers of the pesticides had 
conspired with the distributors to fix the resale price of the 
 193. Id. 
 194. This is, however, a different question from whether the agent is an 
employee of the firm or of a subsidiary. 
 195. In this context a downside risk would be one of condemning an 
arrangement that is not actually anticompetitive. 
 196. 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 197. Id. at 284–85. 
 198. Id. at 285. 
 199. Bayer evidently switched back to the use of distributors as resellers in 
2005.  Id. 
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pesticides.200  The defendants relied on General Electric for the 
proposition that, in effect, there was no resale because the 
distributors were merely agents.201  Interestingly, the plaintiffs 
claimed that Leegin had implicitly overruled General Electric.202
The Valuepest court began its analysis by noting that “General 
Electric addressed what types of relationships constitute agreements 
to set prices for purposes of the Sherman Act.”203  It also concluded 
that “Leegin has no bearing on the continued validity of General 
Electric.”204  While correct that Leegin did not overrule General 
Electric (or at least what was left of General Electric after Simpson 
and Sylvania), the court’s characterizations are a bit simplistic and 
actually obfuscate matters.205  This can be understood by noting that 
General Electric is more accurately characterized as a case 
determining when resale prices have been fixed.  It is not necessary 
or appropriate to read General Electric as saying that any 
agreement that has an impact on prices is legal simply because it 
escapes the per se condemnation of RPM.  In any case, having read 
too much into General Electric and ignoring the opportunity Leegin 
presented, the Valuepest court moved to the conventional formalistic 
analysis of whether the distributors could fairly be regarded as 
agents and thereby immunize both manufacturers and, apparently, 
the distributors themselves.206  In fact, after Leegin, this question 
seems irrelevant. 
Rather than the formalistic analysis, what Leegin allows is a 
more direct and substantive analysis.  It is clear that the parties in 
Valuepest were sufficiently separate to create the plurality of parties 
to establish the existence of an agreement.  There is no indication 
that the distributors, however classified, were employees of the 
manufacturer or partially or wholly owned by the manufacturers or 
subsidiaries of the same parent.  In fact, as already noted, these 
“agents” were former distributors who had bought and resold 
pesticides, including those of the defendants.  An understanding 
between separate entities involving no resale but setting a selling 
price is still an agreement.  Having established the agreement, the 
next step in a section 1 Sherman Act analysis is whether it creates 
 200. Id. at 284. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 286. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 288. 
 205. The court also misinterprets the rule of patents in the General 
Electric/Simpson doctrine.  According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Simpson distinguished General Electric on the basis of the fact that the General 
Electric products involved patents.  Id. at 289.  In fact, the General Electric 
Court, as the Simpson Court correctly noted, indicated that its holding did not 
depend on whether the articles involved were patented.  Simpson v. Union Oil 
Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 23 (1964) (citing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 
U.S. 476, 488 (1926)). 
 206. Valuepest.com., 561 F.3d at 288–94. 
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an unreasonable restraint on trade—whether it is classified as a 
price restraint or nonprice restraint or anything in between that is, 
in fact, where an independent firm acting as an agent may fall. 
Ironically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs, by claiming that Leegin 
overruled General Electric, had “conflate[d] the distinction between 
the two elements required to prove liability under § 1” of the 
Sherman Act.207  This may be true and, again, the court is obviously 
correct that General Electric was not overruled by Leegin.  
Nevertheless, the court was also guilty of conflating the issues.208  
The fact that two separate parties agree on the way in which a 
product will be marketed, but are not involved in a resale, does not 
mean the two requirements of section 1 are not met.  Moreover, it 
seemed to miss the historical significance of General Electric and 
Simpson.  At the core of those cases was an effort to protect from per 
se antitrust condemnation a type of distribution that could 
frequently be pro-competitive.  Now the danger of erroneous per se 
condemnation is unnecessary as is reliance on formalistic solutions 
to the problem of “false positives.”209
To some extent the danger of not recognizing that agents can be 
separate entities for section 1 purposes is exemplified by the 
Valuepest court’s analysis.  In this respect, it is important to note 
that the very same entities that were buying and reselling pesticide 
at one point were quickly switched to the status of agents.  At that 
point it is hard to understand why the court searched any further to 
determine the independence of the agents. 
CONCLUSION 
To a significant degree, Leegin dots the “i” of the Supreme 
Court’s revision of the application of the antitrust laws to vertical 
restraints.210  In the wake of Leegin, what is left unclear is the status 
of the cases the Court decided during the hundred-year reign of Dr. 
Miles that initially had the effect of strengthening and then 
weakening the per se rule.  Many of these cases involved formalistic 
line drawing done in service to the Court’s view of the wisdom of Dr. 
 207. Id. at 288. 
 208. To some extent, the problem is the assumption that an agent by 
definition cannot form a contract for section 1 purposes.  For example, in a 1964 
article the authors write: “Because the retailer does not have title in the goods 
and sells them as an agent for the manufacturer, there can be no conspiracy.”  
Calvani & Berg, supra note 179, at 1178.  The authors do not appear to state, 
however, that this is the law.  Instead, their conclusion is offered as the 
reasoning with which one would support the legality of agency agreements. 
 209. In other words, the danger of prohibiting pro-competitive practices. 
 210. In the context of horizontal restraints, the process of revision is 
somewhat behind.  It appears to be only a matter of time before the Court 
announces new directions in the context of the so-called per se rule against 
tying and the per se status of territorial divisions. 
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Miles.  Now those cases are obsolete with respect to their service of 
the goal of avoiding antitrust errors and could subtract from the 
promise of a more substantive approach. 
One of the series of cases analyzed here focused on the issue of 
when there was an agreement to fix prices and drew the line 
initially at any effort that went further than announcing price and 
not selling to those who did not adhere to that price.  In reality, all 
of these arrangements could have been viewed as contracts under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the emphasis on form over 
substance meant never reaching the issue of possible 
anticompetitive effects.  After Sylvania, this focus on the concept of 
agreement continued as the Court wrestled with the problem that 
price restraints and nonprice restraints were assessed under two 
different standards.  In order to ensure a rule of reason approach to 
nonprice restraints, the Court very narrowly defined what 
constituted an agreement on price. 
Another series of cases concerns whether a product is involved 
in a resale or is sold a single time under a consignment agreement.  
This distinction also meant that the analysis veered from a 
substantive evaluation to questions of whether a resale took place.211  
The focus was entirely without economic content and concerned a 
refined yet formalistic analysis of what it means for a party to be an 
agent. 
Leegin creates an opportunity to move the analysis to a more 
economically meaningful level that avoids the risks associated with 
the more formalistic approaches.  Under the pre-Leegin approach, 
almost certainly anticompetitive arrangements persisted because 
they were classified as not involving agreements.  Similarly, 
especially under the per se standard, arrangements without 
negative competitive effects were condemned.  Leegin eliminates 
those types of errors.  A broad interpretation of what constitutes an 
agreement does not create a risk of an ultimately incorrect decision.  
In order to reach this goal, it needs to be understood that Dr. Miles’s 
orphans no longer serve the purpose they once did, and that 
continuing to follow their analysis squanders the opportunity that 
Leegin offers. 
 211. In other words, were the parties employers and employees or separate 
entities? 
